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Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures:  
A Story about Corporate Transparency from Indonesia 
Abstract 
This study examines the impacts of corporate governance attributes on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) listed companies’ voluntary disclosures. Year-ending 2012 annual report 
disclosures of 100 IDX listed companies are analyzed using a disclosure index. The results 
show a low level of voluntary disclosures (25.97%). The highest level of communication is on 
information regarding companies’ strategies and goals. The regression analysis shows that 
board size is a positive and significant predictor of voluntary disclosure practices. Agency 
theory thus partially explains the variability of these disclosure practices. The main implication 
of the findings is that the number of commissioners determines the strength of the board of 
commissioners in pushing the board of directors to be more transparent.  
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that corporate governance and transparency now become corporations’ 
critical pillars to professionally and sustainably operate. The business history clearly shows that 
accounting scandals and corporate collapses happened around the globe due to the absence of 
corporate governance and the lack of transparency. One of the most popular cases is the Enron 
scandal which also causes the fall of one of the biggest accounting firms in the world, Arthur 
Andersen. In 2002, Arthur Andersen’s license was revoked by U.S. regulators as this 
accounting firm was involved in the Enron scandal (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
 Financial scandals also occurred in Indonesia, an emerging Asian country which is 
currently struggling with corruptions. One of the examples is the case of PT Bank Lippo Tbk. 
In 2002, the management of PT Bank Lippo Tbk provided different versions of financial 
statements to the public and to the management of the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSX)1(Sumantyo, 2003). On one side, PT Bank Lippo Tbk reported a 98 billion Rupiah net 
profit to the public. On the other side, a 1,300 billion Rupiah net loss was reported by the 
management of PT Bank Lippo Tbk to the management of JSX. This scandal resulted in 
significant decreases in this company’s stock prices  
Indonesian companies are expected to implement good corporate governance and 
increase the level of transparency. In Indonesian Corporate Governance Guideline, it is stated 
that weak corporate governance practices and lack of transparency had caused the Asian 
1997/1998 monetary crisis and frauds (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). To 
prevent the presence of such problems, the Indonesian National Committee for Governance 
Policy urges firms to follow the corporate governance principles written in the guideline. Good 
corporate governance practices should promote transparency and thus information asymmetry 
between companies and their stakeholders can be reduced (Radebaugh et al., 2006).    
Voluntary disclosure is one of the key aspects within the growing complexity of an 
emerging market but research on such disclosures in emerging economies is still relatively little 
(Alfraih and Almutawa, 2017). Indonesia itself is an emerging country whose economy and 
capital market are growing (The World Bank, 2017). This nation’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) has increased from 857.00 US dollars in 2000 to 3,603.00 US dollars in 2016. As 
Indonesia is an emerging nation with an impressive economic growth, it is considered 
 
1 The Jakarta Stock Exchange was finally merged with the Surabaya Stock Exchange in 2007 and the merged 
stock exchange was named as the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)(IDX, 2014).  
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important to examine voluntary disclosure practices in this nation, particularly by looking at the 
possible impacts of corporate governance attributes on those practices. 
This study provides several contributions. Firstly, it provides insights into the voluntary 
disclosure practices in an emerging nation, Indonesia, after the establishment of the Indonesian 
Financial Service Authority (OJK) in 2011. The main purpose of the establishment of OJK 
includes monitoring corporate governance practices and transparency (Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia, 2011). Secondly, this study captures the effectiveness of corporate governance 
attributes in increasing transparency in annual reports. Thirdly, this study examines various 
corporate governance attributes. It is thus expected that this study can provide a comprehensive 
picture about corporate governance practices in Indonesia.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
This study uses agency theory as the underlying theoretical framework as voluntary disclosures 
are arguably able to solve an agency problem. Agency theory explains voluntary disclosure 
practices in terms of manager (agent) and owner (principal) relationships (Scott, 2015). In these 
relationships, there is a delegation of authorities from the principle to the agent to undertake 
operational activities, including using financial resources and making decisions, on behalf of 
the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a consequence of this delegation, the agent 
provides financial information through financial statements for the principal.  
The separation of ownership and management in the agency relationship potentially 
results in the presence of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Scott, 
2015). Although ‘standard’ financial statements consisting of statement of financial position, 
statement of comprehensive income, cash flow statement, statement of changes in equity, and 
explanatory notes have been published by companies, arguably, the information asymmetry 
always presents. This is because managers as insiders of the companies’ management have 
better knowledge regarding the daily management activities and thus they always have the 
information advantage.  
As the ‘standard’ financial statements may not sufficiently inform shareholders about 
companies’ performance, it is considered important for managers to undertake certain actions 
so that they can gain trust and continuous investments from shareholders. This is where the role 
of voluntary disclosure comes into play. Through voluntary disclosures, important information 
beyond the limited ‘standard’ accounting information can be communicated and thus the 
information asymmetry problem can be reduced (Scott, 2015). The use of agency theory in this 
study is reflected in the following hypotheses development.  
Companies in Indonesia adopt a two-tier system in which supervision and executive 
functions are separated (Bezemer et al., 2014). In such a system, the board of commissioners 
has the authority to supervise and control the board of directors’ actions. The presence of 
independent commissioners within the board of commissioners is needed so that objective and 
professional advices can be obtained by the board of directors. Such advices help minimize the 
presence of agency conflicts. Prior studies show that the greater proportion of independent 
commissioners within the board results in the higher level of voluntary disclosures (e.g. Al-
Janadi et al., 2013). As such, a directional hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between independence of board and the level of voluntary 
disclosures in annual reports 
 
Usually, a greater number of members in the board of commissioners can provide a more 
effective supervision and monitoring process to the directors (Primastuti and Achmad, 2012). 
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Such a condition can minimize the presence of agency problems. The board of commissioners 
is also considered as having more power to push directors to voluntarily provide more 
information when it has more members in the board. Prior studies have documented a positive 
association between board size and the level of voluntary disclosures (e.g. Nandi and Ghosh, 
2013). The following hypothesis is thus predicted: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board size and the level of voluntary disclosures in 
annual reports 
 
The presence of managerial ownership can reduce the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This is because, through such an ownership, some managers who have shares within 
companies are considered as the shareholders of companies and thus they can ‘feel’ the needs 
and the expectations of shareholders on companies’ activities and information disclosures. 
Companies with a greater proportion of managerial ownership usually provide more voluntary 
information. Such a relationship has been documented in some prior studies (e.g. Primastuti 
and Achmad, 2012). The following hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and the 
level of voluntary disclosures in annual reports 
 
The existence of audit committee is vital as this committee helps ensure that the financial 
statements are fairly presented in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles, 
audits are undertaken in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and the 
management follows up the audit results (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). To 
professionally do this function, an audit committee should be dominated by independent 
members. Li et al. (2008) document a positive relationship between independence of audit 
committee and voluntary disclosure practices. The following hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between independence of audit committee and the level of 
voluntary disclosures in annual reports 
 
3. Research methodology 
A sample of 100 companies was randomly selected from a population of 450 companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2012 (IDX 2012). Data for all variables were 
collected from 2012 annual reports. The dependent variable in this study, voluntary disclosures, 
is measured by a disclosure index. If an item listed in the index checklist is disclosed in the 
annual report, a score of one is awarded. In contrast, a score of zero is awarded if the item is 
not disclosed. The disclosure index for each sample company is then calculated by dividing the 
total score awarded to the company with the maximum number of items listed in the disclosure 
index checklist, which are 17 items. The details of the items are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Voluntary Disclosure Items Used as the Disclosure Index Checklist 
 
No Voluntary Disclosure Items 
1 Explanations on companies’ strategies and goals 
2 Explanations on the impacts of strategies on corporations’ future outcomes 
3 Authority and responsibility within corporations 
4 Prediction of next year’s cash flow 
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5 Research and development programs 
6 Analysis on competitors 
7 Equal opportunities for employees from different ethnic backgrounds and religions 
8 Problems faced in the employee recruitment process and policies for solving those problems 
9 Information about senior managers, which can encompass their names, experiences, and 
responsibilities 
10 Policies for ensuring the continuity of management 
11 Summary of financial statistics for the last six years  
12 Money spent on employees, which can encompass salary and wages 
13 Information about value added 
14 Expected financial returns from project(s) 
15 Current and future impacts of inflation on assets 
16 Possibility of litigation by other parties in the future 
17 Information about parties who attempt to have substantial corporate ownerships 
 
This study also examines industry type and company size as control variables. The 
measurement techniques for the independent variables and control variables are based on prior 
studies’ approaches (e.g. Primastuti and Achmad, 2012; Suhardjanto et al., 2012; Sandy and 
Lukviarman, 2015; Liu, 2016; Cahaya et al., 2017) and are presented in Table 2.  
 
 Table 2: Measurement Approach of the Independent and Control Variables 
Note: * High profile industries include companies with more consumer visibility and a high level of political risk due to the 
nature of their operations (Cahaya et al., 2017). Industries like agriculture, mining, and chemicals are classified as high profile 
whereas industries like finance and services are classified as low profile.   
 
4. Statistical results 
Results of the descriptive statistics for the continuous independent and control variables 
are presented in Table 3. The proportion of independent commissioners in the board ranges 
from 16.67% to 75% with the mean of 40.29%. The mean of board size is about 4 people. On 
average, the proportion of managerial ownership within IDX listed companies’ share capital 
structures is around 10%. The average proportion of independent audit committee members is 
nearly 35%. It is also shown that company size as measured by total assets ranges widely from 
115,772 million Rupiah to 94,955,970 million Rupiah with a mean of about 12,909,528 million 
Rupiah. For the categorical variable, it was found that 55% of sample companies are 
categorized as high profile whereas 45% are classified as low profile.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Independent and Control Variables 










 Percentage of independent commissioners in the board Continuous 
Board size  Number of commissioners in the board Continuous 
Managerial 
ownership 





 Percentage of independent audit committee members in 




1 = high profile industry 




Total assets Continuous 
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Independence of board (%)  16.67 75 40.29 11.72 
Board size (number of commissioners)  2 10 4.34   1.76 
Managerial ownership (%)  0.01 73.91 10.15 17.43 
Independence of audit committee (%)   25 75 34.73 7.12 
Company size ( total assets in million Rupiah )  115,772 94,955,970 12,909,528 22,666,483 
     
The descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosures is reported in Table 4. The mean of voluntary 
disclosure level for all sample companies is 25.97%. Thus, on average, IDX listed companies 
disclose around 4 voluntary disclosure items (out of 17 items) in their annual reports. This 
finding suggests that overall voluntary disclosure practices of Indonesian companies are low.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure Practices 







Deviation (%)  
Voluntary disclosure index (%) of all 100 sample 
companies 
5.88 52.94 25.97 13.01 
 
A closer analysis shows that explanations on companies’ strategies and goals are mostly 
disclosed with 63% of sample companies report this information. This suggests that IDX listed 
companies attempt to obtain trusts from current and potential shareholders by carefully 
informing them about companies’ potential ability to achieve the corporate goals. Such 
information potentially increases companies’ good image in front of the eyes of shareholders  
Hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested by using multiple regression. Classical assumptions 
consisting of multicollinearity, normality, outliers, and homoscedasticity (see Hair et al. 1998), 
have been checked and it was found that all of the assumptions were met. The results of 
multiple regression, displayed in Table 5, can therefore be analyzed.  
 





Coefficient P-value Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)   0.165    0.053   
Independence of board +  0.152   0.194 0.865 1.156 
Board size +  0.020   0.009*** 0.925 1.081 
Managerial ownership + -0.095 0.202 0.971 1.029 
Independence of audit committee  + -0.155    0.392 0.969 1.032 
Industry type (control variable) + 0.016    0.565 0.824 1.214 
Company size (control variable) +               
0.0000000001108 
   0.845 0.980 1.020 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R-Square 0.061 
Standard Error of the Estimate      0.12609 
Regression Model (Sig.)        0.065* 
***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level 
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The regression model is significant at a moderate level (p-value 0.065). The value of adjusted 
R-square is 0.061, showing that the variation of voluntary disclosures is explained by the 
variation of explanatory variables in the model as much as 6.1%. One independent variable, 
which is board size, was found to be highly significant (p-value is smaller than 1% significance 
level). The coefficient of this independent variable is positive, supporting the argument in 
Hypothesis 2 which posits that there is a positive relationship between board size and voluntary 
disclosures. The other hypothesized variables and the control variables are not significant.  
 
5. Discussion  
The important finding of this study was that board size was a positively significant predictor of 
voluntary disclosure practices. This finding is consistent with past studies (e.g. Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; Nandi and Ghosh, 2013) and supports Hypothesis 2 that companies having more 
commissioners in the board voluntarily disclose more information in the annual reports. This 
finding implies that the number of commissioners reflects the strength of the commissioner 
board in supervising and monitoring the board of directors as well as pushing this board to 
undertake particular actions so that the presence of agency problems can be minimized.  
Board independence is found to be statistically insignificant. This result is consistent 
with Alfraih and Almutawa (2017). A possible explanation for this finding is that the 
independence of commissioners in Indonesia is less than optimal due to the influence of family 
ownership structures (see Cahaya et al., 2017). Thus, there might be no ‘professional’ advice 
given by such less-independent commissioners to the board of directors of companies to 
provide more disclosures.   
Managerial ownership is not a significant predictor of voluntary disclosures. A possible 
explanation for this result is that managers with share ownerships attempt to drive companies 
for their own hidden interests and thus ignore the interests of other shareholders. This might be 
because such managers have their own agenda and want to increase their own ‘wealth’. As 
managers understand well about companies’ inside managerial resources and infrastructure, it 
is easy for them to plan their own agenda for their own interests. In such a case, managers 
potentially decide not to disclose some information that may benefit other shareholders. 
Independence of audit committee was found to be insignificant. A possible explanation 
for this insignificance is that the position of audit committee is not directly above the board of 
directors. Due to an audit committee’s position, both independent and non-independent 
members of an audit committee do not have sufficient power to push the board of directors to 
voluntarily disclose more information in the annual reports.  
All control variables examined in this study, industry type and company size, were 
found to be insignificant. These results are consistent with Lokman et al. (2014). A possible 
reason for the insignificance of industry type is that all companies face transparency issues, 
regardless of the industry classification. Similarly, each company, regardless of the size, face 
transparency issues and need trusts from shareholders. Accordingly, all companies attempt to 
disclose all relevant information as much as possible so that they can well inform current 
shareholders and attract potential shareholders.  
In summary, Indonesian listed companies provide a low level of voluntary disclosures. 
It appears that many companies attempt to inform shareholders regarding their ‘promising 
future path’ by explaining the possible link among goals and strategies. The variability of 
voluntary disclosures is partially explained by agency theory. This study provides important 
contributions to the literature by offering additional knowledge regarding the positively 
significant impact of board size on the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Indonesia.  
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